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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
LEGISLATION
AN INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS THREE AND FOUR OF THE
CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT OF 1945 AND RELATED SECTIONS
Chattel mortgages have had legislative sanction in Pennsylvania, at least to
a limited extent, since 1853.1 Since that time the legislature has, by statute, ex-
panded the scope of chattel mortgages bit by bit,2 until today we have, in the
form of the Chattel Mortgage Act of 1945 (as amended), 8 a comprehensive law
covering security transactions of this nature for all types of chattels.
Two phases of the chattel mortgage picture are dealt with here. First, are
goods acquired after the execution of the mortgage capable of being covered by
a mortgagee's lien within the meaning of this act; and, if so, to what extent?
Secondly, can a person mortgage chattels (of any type) for money or credit which
is to be given at some future time; and, if so, under what circumstances?
In order to answer the problems raised above, we must look to a variety of
sources. The primary source is, of course, the act itself. Unfortunately, the drafters
of the present act made it none too clear in its meaning, and the statute is not
altogether free from ambiguity. 4
Secondly, there are court decisions construing the act. Here again our source
is weak, for there has been but one case since the passage of this act that dealt
with the problem and that was decided on another point.5 Therefore, we must
look to the courts' treatment of the Chattel Mortgage Act in general, and try
by analogy to predict the manner in which the courts will deal with the particu-
lar sections on future advances and after-acquired goods.
Outside cases-cases of other jurisdictions on chattel mortgages and Penn-
sylvania cases on subj-ects related to our problem-also are used in the analysis.
A Mortgage Of After-Acquired Goods-Its Validity As Between The Parties.
There is not too much of a problem here. The Act of 1945, P.L. 1358, Sec-
tion 3, specifically says that after-acquired res may be the subject of a chattel
mortgage. 6 As long as the rights of third parties do not interfere, there can be
1 (Mining rights)-April 5, 1853, P.L. 255, 21 P.S. 831.
2 (Leaseholds)-April 27, 1855, P.L. 368, 21 P.S. 838. (iron ore and products, petroleum,
slate and cement)-April 28, 1887, P.L. 73, 21 P.S. 861; (coal rentals and royalties)-May 13,
1889, P.L. 197, 21 P.S. 891; (vessels)-March 7, 1929, P.L. 14, 21 P.S. 921; (General Chattel
Mortgage Act covering loans by federal government agencies)-July 15, 1936, P.L. 47, 21 P.S. 921.
3 Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1358, §§ 1-16, 21 P.S. 940.1-940.16; Act of June 28, 1947, P.L. 1043,
§1; Act of May 23, 1947, P.L. 270, §1; Act of June 27, 1947, P.L. 1070, §1; Act of Sep.
tember 29, 1951, P.L. 425, §§ 1-3.
4 By examining and comparing the present act with the Act of 1943, P.L. 343, 21 P.S. 839
(an act to cover chattel mortgages of farm equipment and produce) we can easily see that the draft-
ers of the present act merely took the text of the Act of 1943 and enlarged its scope by insertion
and addition. This method has proved to be weak and gives rise to much ambiguity and uncertainty.
5 Arcady Farms Mill Co. v. Sedler, 367 Pa. 314, 80 A.2d 845.
6 Quoting from the title of Section 3, "Subsequently acquired property..." See text of Section 3.
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no reason why the parties cannot agree that any property acquired by the mortgagor
after the execution of the mortgage shall fall under the mortgagee's lien on ac-
quisition by the mortgagor. The act specifically mentions farm produce and
progeny, but is not limited to this, for the act calls for "any after-acquired good."
We thus may infer that anything later acquired can come under the mortgagee's
lien if provision is made for it in the instrument.
In addition to the act itself, we find support for this in older Pennsylvania
cases dealing with land mortgages. In Ladley v. Creihtons machinery that was in-
stalled to replace worn-out units was covered by the mortgage. 9
In looking to other jurisdictions, we find an Oklahoma statute similar to
our own'0 interpreted in the case of Stockyards Loan Co. v. Nichols." Here the
court stated, "when the agreement of the chattel mortgage calls for the mortgage
to cover after-acquired goods the lien will attach when the mortgager acquires
the goods." The Alabama, 12 South Dakota,18 Washington 14 and California
courts' 5 are in accord. New York allows mortgages of after-acquired goods stand
as between the parties. 16
A Mortgage Of After-Acquired Goods-Its Validity As To Third Parties
When third parties enter the picture, problems arise. If the parties to the
mortgage comply with the formal requirements of the act'" the mortgagee will
have a lien on the goods covered in the mortgage.' 8 Under what circumstances
will the lien stand good against third parties?
Suppose A has mortgaged all his farm equipment to B, including any farm
equipment A might later acquire. Where the interests of third parties do not in-
terfere, the lien of B will attach as soon as A gets a new tractor. But suppose A
buys a tractor already encumbered? Will B's lien extend or will the previous
encumberancer's rights be paramount? Section 5 of the act19 says that the "lien
shall be good and valid against and superior to all rights of subsequent pur-
7 Quoting from Section 3 of the act, ". . may validly include any chattel of any kind or descrip-
tion .. " See also n. 6, infra.
8 Ladley v. Creihton, 70 Pa. 490, 6 Phila 209 (1872).
9 This was an early chattel mortgage under the Chattel Mortgage Act (1855) (see n. 2) covei-
ing leaseholds.
10 §3829, Revised Laws of Oklahoma, (1910).
11 Stockyards Loan Co. v. Nichols, 1. A.L.R. 547, 243 Fed. 511.
12 In re Alabama Braid Corp., 13 F. Supp. 336-(lien will attach when mortgagor acquires
property).
18 First National Bank v. Simpson, 280 N.W. 873; 66 S.D. 191 (1938)-(interpreting statute,
Rev. Code (1919), § 1529).
14 Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Hambright, 133 P.2d 278, 16 Wash. 2d 81-(interpreting
statute-Rem Rev. Stat., §3780).
15 Bank of California v. McCoy, 72 P.2d 923, 23 Cal. App. 2d 192-(interpreting statute, Civ.
Code, §§2883, 2930).
16 See F & M Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Amsterdam Tavern Inc., 12 N.Y.S. 2d 701, 171 Misc.
352 (1939).
17 Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1358, §8, as amended May 23, 1947, P.L. 270, §1, 21 P.S. 940.8.




chasers, subsequent mortgagees, and other subsequent lienors and encumberanc-
ers, and all persons subsequently dealing with the mortgaged res or subsequently
acquiring interests therein." From the words and tone of this section it can be
clearly seen that the legislature intended that the lien of the chattel mortgagee
shall be paramount only to the rights of thos'e making their claims on a right
brought into existence AFTER the execution of the particular mortgage. So the
answer to the hypothetical case above would be: B's lien would not take priority
over the other lien on the chattel.
In further support of this contention the treatment of this subject by the
legislature can be examined. In U.S. v. Kemmerir,20 the court in construing the
Words of the Chattel Mortgage Act of 1936,21 to wit: "lien good against subse-
quent purchasers and execution creditors. . . " held that the term "subsequent"
modified only the word "purchasers" and not the term "evecution creditors."
This would mean that the lien of a chattel mortgagee would be good against some
existing encumberancers. The legislature, it is contended here, clearly reversed
this line of thinking with the words of the Chattel Mortgage Act of 1945 Sec-
tion 5, supra. (Note the extended use of the word "° ubsequent(ly)" as a modi-
fier.) It should be quite clear that the lien will operate only against those whose
claim of right comes (in point of time) after the execution of the mortgage, and
as applied to after-acquired property, only against those whose liens postdate
the acquisition of the res.
In addition to specifically providing that the mortgagee's lien will not be
good against encumb'erancers previous to the execution of the mortgage, it seems
that the act specifically says that the lien will be good against any and all persons
subsequently dealing with the goods in any way. But the courts have held in two
cases that there might be exceptions to the supposedly ironclad provisions of this
section. In Potter Title & Trust Co. v. International Pennsylvania Colliers22 the
court held that a subsequent claim of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's De-
partm'ent of Labor and Industry (to the use of the Unemployment Compensation
Fund) was paramount to a previously-recorded chattel mortgage. The court base'l
its view on (1) the Unemployment Compensation Act 23 which states that such
a claim by the Department of Labor and Industry "shall first be allowed and paid
out of the proceeds of such (judicial) sale," and (2) on Section 1401 of the
Fiscal Code of April 9, 1929,24 which contains the same words and adds "before
any judgment, mortgage or any other claim or lien" (this referring to priority of
the Commonwealth's claims).
20 U.S. v. Kemmerir, 43 D. & C. 197, 79 Leh.L.J. 301; 10 Som. 389; 56 York 66.
21 1936, first extra session-July 15 P.L. 47, No. 22, §1.
22 Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Int'l Penn. Colliers, 68 D. & C. 591, 14 Som. 255 (1950).
23 Act of December 5, 1936, P.L. 2897, as amended April 23, 1942, P.L. 60, 43 P.S. 788.1.
24 Act of 1929, P.L. 343, as amended June 3, 1933, P.L. No. 1474; June 11, 1935, P.L. 303;
May 28, 1943 P.L. 794, 72 P.S. 1401.
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In the case of Commercial Credit Plan v. Mahoney2s the court held that the
landlord's common law right of distraint was paramount to the recorded chattel
mortgage.26 While these two cases did not involve after-acquired property, the
first can definitely and the second can probably be extended to cover instances
where after-acquired property is included in the chattel mortgage. So while the
act clearly says that the mortgagee's lien will be good against all subsequent parties
dealing with the chattels, the court might easily rule otherwise under certain
conditions.
A Mortgage For Future Advances-Its Validity Between The
Parties And As Against Third Parties
The problem here is to find what type of future advances are covered by
the act. Once this is found, the validity as between the parties and as against third
parties will fall into the pattern discussed previously, i.e. if properly executed,
the mortgage will be valid between the parties and the mortgagee will have a
lien against subsequent persons dealing with the chattels (subject to the previous-
ly-mentioned exceptions laid down by the courts).
Section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage Act of 194527 deals with future advances.
This section states:
"(A)ny chattel mortgage executed under ahd pursuant to this act
may secure a pre-existing debt, advances currently made or contracted
for and future advances, whether obligatory or optional, to be made by
the mortgagee within a period of five (5) years from the date of the
execution of such mortgage, but not to exceed in the aggregate an amount
stated in the mortgage.... (A) II mortgages shall be secured to the same
extent and shall have the same priority as if made at the time of the
execution of the mortgage."
Pennsylvania has long recognized that mortgages may be used for future
advances. In Conrad v. Atlantic Insurance Co.28 the court allowed the mortgage
to cover money to be given by the mortgagee. (The court required the mortgage
also to cover existing debts, but this is clearly unnecessary because of the use of
the disjunctive "and" in the act.29) The same general holding is found in In re
25 Commercial Credit Plan v. Mahoney, 67 D. & C. 577; 32 Erie 172; 14 Som. 200 (1950);
cites First National Bank of Jamestown N.Y. v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A. 2d 61, 62
for strict construction of Chattel Mortgage Act doctrine.
26 While this case is in line. with every major holding since the passage of the act, the weakness
of the entire line is pointed out later.
27 Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1358, §4, 21 P.S. 940.4. This section deals with the type of obli-
gation that the mortgagees assume. This article deals with only one specific kind, future advances.
28 Conrad v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 26 U.S. 386, 1 Pet. 386, 7 LEd. 189.




What is the purpose of such a provision--one which allows a man to put
his chattels as security for money or credit he will receive in the future? The fram-
ers of the act intended that the ability of the average person to secure credit should
be extended. These men conceded that a person owning real estate, government
bonds or gilt-edged securities would and could very easily go to a bank or lend-
ing agency and secure what money he needed. But if a person or business lacks
these 'enumerated securities, the banks or lending agencies will turn their backs
on the one in need. The person in need must then go to a finance company and
pay as much as forty-two per cent annual interest, three and one-half per cent per
month. 81 Small businesses cannot afford to keep large capital reserves; they must
keep most of their investment in their stock and inventory. Consequently, this
inventory, their chief asset, is the only thing they have to offer as security for
the establishment of credit. The Chattel Mortgage Act, therefore, allows them
to trade a lien to the mortgagee in exchange for his promise of future advances
or credit.
This is an excellent device for the small businessman or individual and
it serves the person extending the credit equally well. But what of the rights
of third parties, especially the mortgagor's other creditors?
Let us put ourselves in the place of such a third party and consider some of
the problems that might arise. We want to carry on business transactions with
Mr. A. When checking his credit rating we find that there is a recorded chattel
mortgage given by Mr. A to Mr. B to secure future advances. For how long,
we may ask, will Mr. B's lien attach to these chattels? The act in Section 4 states
that the mortgage secures all advances within a period of five years from the
date of the execution.
Suppose we get a judgment against A after the execution of the mortgage
to B, but before B actually makes any advances (the act which gives rise to the
mortgagee's lien)? Will we be subsequent encumberancers within the meaning
of Section 5 of the act or will our encumberance predate Mr. B's, thus freeing
us from the lien? The last lines of Section 4 answer this by saying that when-
ever (within the five-year period) the mortgagee maks his advances, the mort-
gage shall be secured to the same extent as if made at the time of the execution
of the mortgage.
Other questions arise, questions, the answers to which are not so readily
apparent. Suppose the mortgage calls for $5000 in future advances. Four ad-
vances of a thousand dollars each are made. The mortgagor then pays back two
80 In re Mode's Estate, 76 Pa. 502, 6 Lanc. Bar 138; 22 P.L.J. 127. The court limited the de-
cision by saying that such a mortgage would be no good against third parties who levied against
the goods before the mortgagee took possession. But since possession by the mortgagee is no long-
er essential to a valid lien (1936, extra session July 15, P.L. 47, No. 22, §5) the case supports
the present view. See also Stewart v. Stocker 1 Watts 135 (1832); and Lyle v. Ducomb, 5 Binn.
585 (1813).
81 Legislative Journal-(Senate), vol. 29, no. 30, 1291-2, an address by Mr. Gourley.
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thousand dollars. The question arises, may the mortgagee advance three thousand
dollars to the mortgagor (the armount necessary to bring the present indebted-
less up to the stated limit) and have his lien for the full amount, or is he limit-
ed to a one thousand dollar advance (the amount needed to bring the total ad-
vances to the stated amount)? In other words, is the amount stated in the agree-
ment of the parties a definite limit on total advances or is it a floating limit on
the amount due and owing at any one particular time?
Most jurisdictions hold that in the absence of specific stipulation by the
parties, the coverage of the lien is on a floating balance good up to the amount
stated in the mortgage.32 At least one court has held that the lien is good even
if the mortgagor has already paid back much more than the original specified
amount. 83
Pennsylvania, however, might take a completely different view on this. Sec-
tion 4 says, "...but not to exceed in the aggregate the amount stated in the mort-
gage . ... What do the words "exceed in the aggregate" connote? Can they be
interpreted as meaning the total advance or do they mean the total at any one
time? To best carry out the desire of the legislature to more easily facilitate credit,
it would be better to take the "floating" view accepted by the majority of juris.
dictions. An objection might be raised to this by stating that this will be unfair
to the third party who knows of the recorded mortgage but will never know for
just what amount the mortgagee's lien will hold. But it can be answered that the
same is true as to any third party and any mortgage. The payments by the mort-
gagor are not a matter of record until the mortgage is satisfied of record. In all
cases the third party can only take the word of one or both of the parties as to
the amount of satisfaction. Of course, in mortgages of this type the third patty
has the added disadvantage of having later advances becoming effectively covered
by the lien as of the execution date, but I cannot help feeling that the advan-
tages to the immediate parties of a transaction of this type far outweigh the
disadvantages to third parties. The adoption of the floating doctrine would not
increase a third party's disadvantage beyond what they are or would be under
th'e single total interpretation.
However, the courts of Pennsylvania will, in all probability, adopt the single
total interpretation. There are no cases directly on point, but two sources sup-
port this prediction.
First, there is the judicial interpretation of words almost identical with those
of the statute in the case of In re Miller's Estate.84 In that case there was a will
which granted from the principal of a trust fund emergency advances. ". . not
exceeding in the aggregate $500 ... " The claimant beneficiary contended that
82 See 152 A.L.R. 1184 for citations.
83 See Rutherford v. Edward L. Eyre & Co., 174 Ore. 162, 148 P.2d 530. Mortgagor had already
paid back $15,200 when stated limit was $7600.
84 In re Miller's Estate, 168 A. 807; 110 Pa. Super. 384.
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this meant that there could be an unlimited number of emergency advances, no
one of which might exceed $500 (this view being analagous to the floating total
interpretation). The Superior Court, however, held that the true interpretation
of the phrase was not a $500 limit for any one advance, but a total of $500 in-
emergency advances (this view being analagous to the single total interpretation).
So the Superior Court's definition is almost exactly like that of the statute.
In addition to this we have an entire line of cases holding that the Chattel
Mortgage Act shall be strictly cohstrued. And it should be clear that strict con-
struction will bring about the single total view.85
Another question might arise from the words of Section 4, "whether obli-
gatory or optional." Two old Pennsylvania mortgage decisions held that where
the advances were obligatory, the mortgagee's lien would stand against anyone
who deals with the security chattels between the time of execution and the time
the advances are made.8 6.. Another case held that where the advances were op-
tional, the mortgagee before making the advances should look to the record to
avoid conflicts.8 7 This would seem to show that the common law would favor
the third party in future advance cases where the advances were optional. How-
ever, the present statute states that the mortgagee's lien would be paramount
even if the advances were optional. The act classifies future advances "whether
obligatory or optional" and closes Section 4 with "shall be secured to the same
extent as if made at the time of the execution ... "
Suppose no limit is stated in the mortgage; to what extent will the lien of
the mortgagee hold? The majority of courts say the mortgage is still good for
all of the advances,88 but here again Pennsylvania would probably follow the
principles of strict construction.3 9
Conclusion
We have seen thus far that a great deal of the interpretation of the act's
provisions must be, by necessity, conjectural. Furthermore, in predicting the way
the courts will hold on various points, we have seen that a great deal depends on
whether the courts will apply a strict or liberal basis for construction of the statute.
The question of the courts' view came up in considering the issue of against whom
the mortgagee's lien shall hold, of whether the courts will adopt the single total
or floating view on the limit of future advances and on other key points. Each
time the problem came up it was pointed out that the judiciary has taken or prob-
ably would take the strict view. If it does and continues to do so, all the forego-
85 For citations and discussion see the conclusion to this article and accompanying footnotes, infra.
86 See Parmentier v. Gillespie, 9 Pa. 86 (1848); also Pennock v. Copeland, 1 Phila 29 (1850).
Cf., real estate mortgages, 152 A.L.R. 1182.
87 See Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, 2 Pa. St. Rep. 96 (1845).
88 See 81 A.L.R. 631 for citations.
89 See n. 35, supra. Cf., real estate mortgages, 306 Pa. 64.
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ing questions will have one set of answers; if, on the other hand, the courts should
liberally construe the act's provisions, another complete set of answers will appear.
It has been pointed out that the courts favor strict construction. A complete
line of cases hold that the Chattel Mortgage Act is in derogation of the common
law and as such its provisions must be followed to the letter.40 They go on to say
that chattel mortgages in themselves are contrary to public policy and the act con-
cerning them must be construed so as to limit their use. 4' These statements are
not the words of a single court in a single case, but can be found in practically
every holding that has dealt with the act. The courts seem determined in their stand.
But, we may ask, is their decision the proper one? I think not. The arguments
of the courts seem to be weak. Tht courts are construing the words of the legisla-
ture in such a way as to lend to them a meaning almost exactly opposite to the
meaning the legislature intended. The weakness of the contention of the courts, is
shown by the Kemmerir decision, supra, which was clearly reversed by the legis-
lature in the present act.42 Also the Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937
(P.L. 1019, art. IV, sec 58; 46 P.S. 1558) clearly states:
"The rule that laws in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed shall have no application to the laws of this Common-
wealth hereafter enacted."
What could be dearer than this? Yet the courts go on saying that the act
does not mean what it says and that the provisions of the act are to be strictly in-
terpreted. One case even cited the Statutory Construction Act and blandly said that
it didn't apply to the Chattel Mortgage Act, without giving reasons.43
If this were all there was to go by, it could be said that a deplorable con-
dition exists, but the courts will not change. However, there seems to be one last
chance.
In May, 1951, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in the case of Arcady
Farm Mills Co. v. Sedler44 that a purported chattel mortgage was invalid. The
court based its decision on the following grounds:
First, that there was no bond or note accompanying the chattel mort-
gage as required by the first section of the act. Next, that the mort-
iagor's signature was not witnessed (also required by the act), and
finally, that the act must be strictly construed, here citing the entire line
of cases so holding.45
40 See Roos v. Fairy Silk Mills, 5 A.2d 569, 334 Pa. 305 (1939) ; First National Bank of James-
town N.Y. v. Sheldon, 54 A.2d 61, 62, 161 Pa. Super. 265; Roberts & Pynes' Appeal, 60 Pa. 400;
Klaus v. Majestic Apt. House Co., 250 Pa. 194, 95 A. 451; Kaufman & Baer v. Monroe Motor
Line (Transp), 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 A. 296; Commercial Credit Plan v. Mahoney, 67 D. &
C. 577, 32 Erie 172, 14 Som. 409; Newcomer v. Reese, 13 Fay.L.J. 102; Seabord Consumer Dis-
count Co., v. Landau Inc., 74 A.2d 737, 167 Pa. Super. 180. (1950).
41 See n. 40.
42 See n. 18.
43 See Arcady Farm Mills Co. v. Sedler, 367 Pa. 314; 80 A.2d 845.
44 Ibid.
45 See n. 40, supra.
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At this point the decision looked like just more salt on the wound. But four
months later a bill left the legislature and became law.46 This amendment to the
Chattel Mortgage Act of 1945, it is here contended, was a complete reversal of
the Sedler case and its predecessors. First, the new act specifically ruled down the
Sdler case by providing that neither bond nor note nor witnesses to the mort-
gagor's signature shall hereafter be required. Finally, the last provision of the
amendment sets forth:
"...the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Act shall be liberally
construed to hold valid chattel mortgages made in good faith to se-
cure bona fide loans which substantially comply with the provisions
of this act." (Emphasis mine.)
It is difficult to conceive a clearer repudiation of the courts' holdings or for
that matter, a clearer statement of the legislative intent. If it were not for the ju-
diciary's disregard of the Statutory Construction Act which states generally what
the new amendment states specifically, a liberal construction could be predicted
hereafter. However, in view of what has transpired, we can only now wait for
the courts' reply to this latest legislative declaration.
Jerome H. Gerber
Member of the Senior Class
4. Act of September 29, 1951, P.L. 1632, §§ 1-4, 21 P.S. 940.1, 940.2, 940.q and 940.17.
